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The Securities Exchange Act and the Rule
of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction
Rules establishing exclusive jurisdiction of specific legal claims are
designed to provide judges and litigants clear guidance in determining
the forum in which a suit should be brought. A statutory grant of
exclusive jurisdiction can minimize the cost of threshold litigation
generated by the need to define the appropriate forum for adju-
dication. The modem development of the transactional case,' how-
ever, is not easily reconciled with exclusive jurisdiction; federal, state,
and common law claims regularly merge to form the basis for liti-
gation.2 The economies realized by the expansive concept of a case
thus conflict with the efficient jurisdictional rule of exclusivity.
The tensions between procedural reform3 and a jurisdictional pat-
tern premised on the segregation of federal and state law claims are
illustrated by the problems generated by the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.4 In particular, this tension is
manifested by the disparate treatment of defenses and counterclaims
arising under the Exchange Act. Although a state court may adjudicate
an Exchange Act defense, it is not permitted to hear an Exchange
Act counterclaim. This semi-exclusivity engenders a litigation pat-
I. The transactional case refers to a unitary adjudication which resolves multiple
disputes arising from a given set of facts. Transactional cases are possible for two
reasons. First, federal courts may exercise broad discretion in accepting state law claims
as pendent to federal causes of action. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (federal
courts have "power" to hear state and federal claims derived from common operative
facts). Second, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for liberal joinder of all
parties, claims, and remedies relevant to the same factual transaction. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 18-20. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 20-22 (2d ed. 1977) [here-
inafter cited as JAMES & HAZARD].
2. See, e.g., UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966) (discussing close relation in certain
situations of state and federal claims).
3. Culminating in the transactional case, see note I supra, the movement for pro-
cedural reform was premised largely on the acceptance of liberal pleading rules. With
the adoption in 1938 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal system rejected
both the formulaic common law pleadings and the law/fact distinction demanded of
"code" complaints. The modem rules simply require that federal complaints "contain
. . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief ....." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). See generally JAMES & HAzARD, supra note 1, at 62-88.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78iii (1976). The jurisdictional section is § 78aa.
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tern with consequences harmful to both Exchange Act litigants and
courts.
This Note argues that the problems fostered by the inherent ten-
sion between exclusive jurisdiction and the transactional case can-
not be resolved solely by a reallocation of jurisdiction; only by inte-
grating a clear jurisdictional scheme with procedural protection can
a solution be designed. The Note proposes an amendment to the
Exchange Act that would permit state court adjudication of both
Exchange Act defenses and counterclaims, and would also require
the application of federal procedural safeguards to all issues arising
under the federal statute. Such an amendment would both fulfill the
policies underlying federal jurisdiction and reconcile the tension be-
tween the need for clear jurisdictional rules and the economies of
the transactional case.
I. The Breakdown of Exclusivity
Section 27 of the Exchange Act provides for exclusive federal jur-
isdiction of claims arising under the Act.r This provision was pre-
sumably intended to establish a clear and efficient allocation of re-
sponsibility between the state and federal judicial systems.0 In erecting
a barrier to state court adjudication, the section 27 grant of exclusive
federal jurisdiction presumed to define unambiguously the jurisdic-
tional consequences arising from the assertion of an Exchange Act
claim.
The emergence of the transactional case, however, brought into
question the rule of exclusive federal jurisdiction as it had developed
under the Exchange Act. Although the rule of exclusivity has pre-
vented the intrusion of plaintiffs' Exchange Act claims into state
courts,7 the pressures for unitary litigation have further obscured an
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). Section 27 states:
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.
6. Examination of the legislative history of the Exchange Act suggests that the 1934
Congress did not consider carefully the advantages of a rule providing for exclusive
federal jurisdiction. See note 58 infra.
7. In the course of dismissing plaintiff Exchange Act claims, state courts have con-
sistently indicated that Exchange Act plaintiff actions can only be heard within a federal
forum. See, e.g., Webster v. Steinberg, 84 Nev. 426, 429, 442 P.2d 894, 896 (1968); Elias-
berg v. Standard Oil Co., 23 NJ. Super. 431, 444, 92 A.2d 862, 869 (super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1952), aff'd, 12 N.J. 467, 97 A.2d 437 (1953); American Distilling Co. v. Brown, 295 N.Y.
36, 41-42, 64 N.E.2d 347, 349 (1945).
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already clouded vision of exclusivity on the defendants' side: long
standing principles of procedure require state courts to hear federal
defenses,8 but not federal counterclaims. 9 Thus, exclusive jurisdiction
under section 27 is incomplete: a state court must exercise jurisdiction
over defenses based on the Act 10 and can award equitable relief on the
8. In 1897, the Supreme Court held that state courts may adjudicate "questions"
arising under exclusive acts. Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897)
(clear distinction between exclusive act "case"-plaintiff action-which must be heard in
federal court and exclusive act "question"--defense-which may be raised in state forum).
See generally D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 373-80 (2d ed. 1975); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN,
D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 431-38, 874-79 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
The value of the Court's "clear distinction" between cases and questions arising under
exclusive acts is diminished by the integral relation of exclusive act defenses and affir-
mative claims. While a state defendant may raise an exclusive act defense, the litigant
cannot plead in the state forum an affirmative counterclaim based on the same ex-
clusive act, see note 9 infra.
In the context of Exchange Act claims, the Supreme Court has specifically recognized
state court jurisdiction of Exchange Act defenses. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437
U.S. 655, 660 n.3 (1978) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (arising in mandamus case
involving parallel state and federal securities law actions). Without evaluating such
precedents as Pratt, the Supreme Court did not dispute state court jurisdiction of an
Exchange Act defense.
Numerous lower federal decisions concur in the Will approach. See, e.g., Calvert Fire
Ins. Co. v. American Mutual Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1231 (7th Cir. 1979) ("we
have interpreted Section 27 of the 1934 Act to allow concurrent jurisdiction in the state
court of 1934 Act defenses to a state cause of action") (footnote omitted); Weiner v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 1975) (state court had jurisdiction
to rule on Exchange Act issues as a matter of affirmative defense to a state defendant's
counterclaim); McGough v. First Arlington Nat'l Bank, 519 F.2d 552, 555 n.1 (7th Cir.
1975) (exclusive jurisdiction of Exchange Act does "not preclude a state court defendant
from pleading, and a state court from recognizing, an affirmative defense of illegality
under the Act").
9. See, e.g., Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 666 (1978) (claim for affirmative
Exchange Act relief-damages-can only be adjudicated in federal court); Calvert Fire
Ins. Co. v. American Mutual Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1231 (7th Cir. 1979) ("juris-
diction over claims for affirmative relief under the Act is exclusively vested in the
federal courts"); Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 1975)
(serious doubt as to state court's jurisdiction to try affirmative relief under Exchange
Act); McGough v. First Arlington Natl Bank, 519 F.2d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1975) (affirma-
tive federal remedies cannot be awarded in "sterile state court").
One decision has ambiguously suggested that state courts are competent to adjudicate
"historical facts" underlying an Exchange Act counterclaim. See Colter v. Inter-County
Orthopaedic Ass'n, 526 F.2d 537, 542 (3d Cir. 1975) ("state court may be able to de-
termine the historical facts in this ongoing dispute" involving parallel state and federal
securities claims).
10. State court acceptance of jurisdiction over Exchange Act defenses has been most
prevalent in the context of margin requirement litigation. See, e.g., Gregory-Massari,
Inc. v. Purkitt, I Cal. App. 3d 968, 82 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1969); J. Cliff Rahel & Co. v.
Roper, 186 Neb. 34, 180 N.W. 2d 682 (1970). Jurisdiction over § 10(b) antifraud de-
fenses has also been exercised. See, e.g., Southern Brokerage Co. v. Cannarsa, 405 S.W.2d
475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1004 (1967). See generally 4 A. BROM-
aERG, SECURITIES LAw 244.11 (Supp. 1974). For analysis of state court margin requirement
adjudication, see pp. 112-13 infra.
Despite the Supreme Court's interpretation of exclusive jurisdiction in Pratt v. Paris
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basis of a successful Act defense.'1
The pattern of litigation culminating in Will v. Calvert Fire Insur-
ance Co. 12 illustrates the antagonism of the theory of the transactional
case and the rule of exclusive jurisdiction. The state court plaintiff,
American Mutual Reinsurance Co., brought suit to obtain an order
that an agreement was effective despite defendant Calvert Fire In-
surance Co.'s rescission of the agreement. 3 In its answer, the defen-
dant aggregated defenses premised on state securities law and on two
federal securities acts-the Securities Act of 193314 [1933 Act] and
the Exchange Act.' 5 Due to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Exchange
Act, however, the state defendant was limited in its counterclaim to
an action grounded in state law and the 1933 Act,'
6 which provides
for concurrent jurisdiction. 17 As a result of this disparate treatment
Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255 (1897), see note 8 supra, certain anomalous cases
have construed section 27 as mandating rejection of a state court defendant's Exchange
Act defense. See Reuben Rose & Co. v. Davon Assoc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 92,109 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) (affirmative defenses and counterclaims
based on violations of Exchange Act dismissed); Investment Assoc. v. Standard Power
& Light Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 225, 48 A.2d 501 (Ch. 1946), aff'd, 29 Del. Ch. 593, 51 A.2d
572 (Del. 1947) (violation of Exchange Act proxy regulations could not be raised as
defense in suit to review corporate election). For discussion of the question of state
court defense jurisdiction, see Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and State Law, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1249, 1254-57 (1960); Note, The Effect of Prior Nonfederal Proceedings on Exclusive
Federal Jurisdiction Over Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 46 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 936, 937-38 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Nonfederal Proceedings].
11. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 666 n.9 (1978) (state court has
jurisdiction to award equitable relief of rescission); Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American
Mutual Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1230 (7th Cir. 1979) (same). Other federal courts
appear to be confused as to whether state court jurisdiction of an Exchange Act af-
firmative defense of illegality is equivalent to the equitable relief of rescission. See, e.g.,
Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 1975) (recognizes state
court jurisdiction of affirmative defense but does not specifically indicate whether
state court may award equitable relief); McGough v. First Arlington Nat'l Bank, 519 F.2d
552, 554-55, 555 n.1 (7th Cir. 1975) (fails to elucidate whether "exclusive federal remedy
sought under the complaint in the District Court [that] is not available ... in the State
action" is rescission or money damages). But see Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc.,
321 F. Supp. 806, 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 452 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1971) (appears to suggest
that rescission is an "affirmative claim").
12. 437 U.S. 655 (1978). For the subsequent history of the case as remanded, see note
25 infra.
13. 437 U.S. at 658.
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
15. 437 U.S. at 658. Calvert's answer premised on 1933 Act and Exchange Act grounds
was not filed until six months after the state plaintiff had initiated suit. Had Calvert
answered within thirty days, it would have been able to remove the case to federal
court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446(a), (b) (1976).
For discussion of Calvert's failure to remove, see Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mutual
Reinsurance Co., 459 F. Supp. 859, 862 & n.3, 864 (N.D. I1. 1978), aff'd, 600 F.2d 1228,
1232 & n.10 (7th Cir. 1979).
16. 437 U.S. at 658.
17. See § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976).
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of Exchange Act defenses and counterclaims, the state defendant could
preserve its Exchange Act damages remedy only by bifurcating its
affirmative claims. Contemporaneous with its answer, therefore, the
state defendant entered federal court as an Exchange Act plaintiff.'8
In an attempt to confine litigation to the initial forum, the state
plaintiff sought to dismiss or stay the federal action.' 9 Believing that
parallel litigation would be both duplicative and wasteful, the dis-
trict court stayed all elements of the federal proceeding with the ex-
ception of the federal plaintiff's "exclusive" Exchange Act claim.2 0
Nevertheless, the district court delayed in adjudicating the exclusive
federal claim.2 ' Frustrated by what was an effective stay of the entire
federal proceedings,22 the federal plaintiff petitioned the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for a writ of mandamus directing
District Court Judge Will to proceed with adjudication of the Ex-
change Act claims.23 The Seventh Circuit granted the petition.24 Find-
ing that the district court had not heedlessly refused to proceed with
plaintiff's Exchange Act claims, a sharply split Supreme Court re-
versed.25 State litigation in Calvert has been equally protracted; five
18. 437 U.S. at 658.
19. Id. at 659.
20. Id. at 659-60. For discussion of stays of parallel federal actions, see note 40 infra.21. Following his stay order, District Court Judge Will did hear oral argument "onthe basic question of whether Calvert's interest in the reinsurance pool . . . [was] a
security within the meaning of the 1934 Act." 437 U.S. at 660 (Supreme Court review -
of case's procedural history). However, the Judge failed to issue a ruling on this question.Id. (District Court decision outstanding at time of Supreme Court review of SeventhCircuit mandamus order). Meanwhile in the parallel state proceeding, Illinois Circuit
Court Judge Dunne ruled (approximately one month after Judge Will's stay order) thatthe reinsurance agreement was not a security within the meaning of the federal securities
laws. See American Mutual Reinsurance Co. v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 52 Ill. App. 3d922, 367 N.E.2d 104 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978) (Illinois Appellate Court
affirmance on interlocutory appeal of trial judge's ruling); Weissman, Reinsurance
Pools and the Federal Securities Laws, 9 Loy. CH. L.J. 313, 314-15 (1978). Following the
state trial judge's order, "[a]t that point, and not before, Judge Will apparently decidedinformally on his own motion to postpone decision on the federal security question."Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mutual Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1231 (7th Cir.
1979).
22. In its original mandamus opinion, see notes 23-24 infra, the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that the actions of Judge Will were "equivalent to a dismissal for purposes of
this case." Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 1977).
23. 437 U.S. at 660.
24. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 1977).25. 437 U.S. at 667. While five Justices concurred in the reversal and remand, no
more than four Justices joined in any one opinion. Writing for Justices Stewart, White,
and Stevens, Justice Rehnquist indicated that the decision to defer to state court pro-
ceedings was "largely committed to the discretion of the District Court." 437 U.S. at 664.Only proof of a "heedless refusal to proceed" could support the extraordinary relief of
mandamus. 437 U.S. at 666-67. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment on much
more narrow grounds. As Judge Will issued the stay order prior to the Supreme Court's
opinion in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)
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years after initiation of the state action, final decision on the trial
level remains outstanding.2 6
II. The Failure of Exchange Act Exclusive Jurisdiction
Although the anomalous treatment of defenses and counterclaims
establishes that exclusive jurisdiction is incomplete, this development
alone is no cause for serious concern. However, analysis of the liti-
gation obstacles and alternatives encountered by the parties in Will
demonstrates that semi-exclusivity, at least as it operates in the con-
text of the Exchange Act, has a serious, detrimental impact on the
protection of Exchange Act rights and on judicial economy. By pro-
viding that certain federal claims would be heard in a federal forum,
the rule of exclusive federal jurisdiction ensures that a federal claim-
ant enjoys whatever benefits a federal judge and federal procedure
offer. This rule also lowers the costs of establishing the appropriate
forum for adjudication. However, the collision of the transactional
case with the rule of exclusive jurisdiction has frustrated realization
of these fundamental goals.
A. Prejudice to Exchange Act Claims
The state defendant in Will was compelled to raise his Exchange
Act defense to avoid an adverse judgment;27 because he could not
(outlining appropriate grounds for dismissing federal action that parallels state suit;
stay of federal action not considered), "'The Court of Appeals should have done no more
than require reconsideration of the case by Judge Will in light of Colorado River." 437
U.S. at 668 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Powell dissented from the Court's judgment. For analysis of the
impact of Colorado River on the Will opinions, see Note, Abstention and Mandamus
After Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 64 CORNELL L. REv. 566, 579-85 (1979); 24 VILL.
L. REv. 815, 820-24 (1979).
On remand, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's decision along the
narrow lines suggested by Justice Blackmun's opinion. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 586
F.2d 12, 14 (1978) (on its own motion district court will "reconsider its actions . . . in
light of Colorado River"). After reviewing his original stay ruling, Judge Will ordered
continuation of the stay largely on the basis of Calvert's admission in Supreme Court
oral argument as to its inability to recover on its affirmative § 10b damages claim, 459
F. Supp. 859, 861-63 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd, 600 F.2d 1228, 1236 (7th Cir. 1979).
26. See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mutual Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1236
(7th Cir. 1979); telephone conversation with bailiff for Illinois Circuit Court (Cook
County) Judge Dunne (October 2, 1979) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
On Calvert's motion in state court, discovery had been stayed in the state proceedings
pending Supreme Court review of the Seventh Circuit's mandamus order. See Calvert
Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mutual Reinsurance Co., 459 F. Supp. 859, 864 &- n.5 (N.D.
I1. 1978), aff'd, 600 F.2d 1228, 1234 & n.14 (7th Cir. 1979).
27. A state defendant may be forced to raise an Exchange Act defense due to the
absence of state or common law analogues. For example, Exchange Act margin regulations
may provide the only available defense to a broker's state suit based on a deficiency in a
100
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raise the related counterclaim, however, he was obliged to bring a
simultaneous suit in federal court.28 The problem of duplicative liti-
gation is compounded by two interrelated factors: the federal tri-
bunal is likely to accord collateral estoppel2 9 effect to important find-
ings of fact developed in the state court adjudication of the Exchange
Act defense, and these state-determined facts may be the product
of state discovery rules that are less liberal than the federal rules.
To avoid prejudice to his rights under the Exchange Act, then, the
litigant must attempt simultaneous litigation.
Although the relationship of exclusive jurisdiction and collateral
estoppel is still the subject of controversy and speculation,3" federal
courts appear to have settled upon a formula for determining the
preclusive effect of prior state determinations on suits brought pur-
suant to federal securities law: federal courts will accord collateral
estoppel effect to state court findings of fact, but not to mixed find-
ings of fact and law.31 Since Exchange Act defenses and counterclaims
customer's stock account, see notes 68-69 infra. In those circumstances in which roughly
equivalent defenses do exist, an Exchange Act defense may serve as a superior litigation
weapon. For example, a common law fraud defense generally requires the showing of a
privity relationship, but a § 10(b) Exchange Act anti-fraud defense does not. See Cochran
v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 244-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
28. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 658 (1978).
29. In the context of subsequent litigation, the term collateral estoppel describes the
preclusive effect accorded determinations of issues litigated in a former action. See JAMES
& HAZARD, sukra note 1, at 563; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1877).
30. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 668 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the
preclusive effect of a state-court determination of a claim within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal courts is an unresolved and difficult issue") (footnote omitted); Calvert Fire
Ins. Co. v. American Mutual Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1236 n.18 (7th Cir. 1979) ("resjudicata effect of a prior state court decision . . . is an unsettled question"); Colter v.
Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, 526 F.2d 537, 542 (3d Cir. 1975) ("Litigation over thejudgment preclusion effects of the state court decision ... probably will be as complex as
if the federal court had gone ahead with the entire case.") But see RESTATEMENT OF JUDG-
MENTs § 71 (1942) ("Where a court has incidentally determined a matter which it would
have had no jurisdiction to determine in an action brought directly to determine it, thejudgment is not conclusive in a subsequent action brought to determine the matter
directly.") Literal adherence to § 71 would fully immunize federal courts from the pre-
clusive effect of prior state determinations. Securities case law has not followed the lead
of § 71. See note 31 infra.
The certainty of the first Restatement has been supplanted by an ambiguous approach
of the second Restatement linking issue preclusion with "procedural quality" and
"jurisdictional allocation." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1(c) (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 1977) ("[a] new determination of... [a previously litigated] issue is warranted
by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts
or by factors relating to the allocation of jurisdiction between them"). The second Re-
statement fails, however, to provide substantive guidelines as to the evaluation of pro-
cedural quality or jurisdictional allocation.
31. The origins of this collateral estoppel theory can be traced to the Learned Hand
opinion in Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 825 (1955). Hand broadly stated that "the grant to the district courts of exclusivejurisdiction . . . should be taken to imply an immunity of their decisions from any pre-judgment elsewhere; at least on occasions . . . where the putative estoppel includes the
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arising out of any transaction are likely to involve identical issues,32
the possibility exists that state courts hearing Exchange Act defenses
will, in effect, adjudicate affirmative Exchange Act claims.3 3 The
whole nexus of facts that makes up the wrong." Id. at 189. However, Hand suggested
that state court specific findings of facts, as opposed to mixed findings of fact/law, should
be accorded preclusive effect in federal proceedings: "the distinction [exists] between the
finding of one of the constituent facts that together make up a claim and the entire
congeries of such facts, taken as a unit; an estoppel is good as to the first but not as to
the second." Id. at 188.
The Hand estoppel formula has gained direct or indirect recognition in a number of
federal securities decisions. See, e.g., Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mutual Reinsurance
Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1236 n.18 (7th Cir. 1979) ("fairly settled ... that state court findings of
fact are entitled to collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent federal suit, even if dispositive
of the federal question") (emphasis in original); Colter v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n,
526 F.2d 537, 542 (3d Cir. 1975) (inference that only state-developed historical facts may
be estopped; application of law to facts must take place only in federal court); Vernitron
Corp. v. Benjamin, 440 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971) (doctrine
of collateral estoppel would be applied in any instance where state court had determined
a factual issue arising in a subsequent federal litigation). Hand's dictum as to the pre-
clusive effect of state court factual findings has been considerably more influential than
his dictum suggesting broader federal immunity. But see Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437
U.S. 655, 675 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Hand's broad immunity statement as
support for argument against according collateral estoppel effect to state developed his-
torical facts). For analysis of the rationale supporting Brennan's "no estoppel" theory,
see note 75 infra.
32. The interrelation between Exchange Act defenses and counterclaims can be
demonstrated by a common fact situation: plaintiff alleges in state court that defendant
has defaulted on a promissory note tendered in exchange for securities; defendant pleads
at the state level that the stock agreement should be rescinded on the basis of § lOb-5
fraud. As a "counterclaim" cannot be raised in state court, this same defendant then
enters federal court seeking damages as a § lob-5 plaintiff. To a large degree, the federal
and state suits require proof of the same facts.
33. While unlikely, it is possible that the doctrine of res judicata or "claim preclu-
sion" may also frustrate the state court defendant's federal assertion of an affirmative
Exchange Act claim. The term res judicata refers to the procedural principle by which
prior judgment on a given claim precludes relitigation of the same cause of action. See
JAMEs 9- HAZARD, supra note I, at 532-33.
Res judicata has been applied to bar federal assertion of Exchange Act rights in cases
of parallel plaintiff actions: in two cases, plaintiffs who failed in state securities actions
were barred from relitigating the "same cause of action" as a parallel Exchange Act claim
in federal court. Connelly v. BalkwiIl, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d
685 (6th Cir. 1960) (per curiam) (plaintiff's federal § 10b suit barred as result of state
judgment for defendant on common law fraud claim; court held in alternative that
principle of collateral estoppel precluded relitigation); Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 154 F.
Supp. 64 (D. Del. 1954) (on identity of actions theory, adverse judgment by state court on
state proxy law suit barred plaintiff's § 14 Exchange Act suit). Connelly has not been
followed, see, e.g., Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 997-98 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
841 (1975); Klein v. Walston & Co., 432 F.2d 936, 937 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam); cf. Will
v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 674 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("For myself, I
confess to serious doubt that it is ever appropriate to accord res judicata effect to a
state court determination of a claim over which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdic-
tion; for surely state court determinations should not disable federal courts from ruling
de novo on purely legal questions surrounding such federal claims.") However, res judicata
may be applicable to cases in which state court approval of Exchange Act settlements is
the subject of later federal litigation. See Boothe v. Baker Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 168
(D. Del. 1966); Dembitzer v. First Republic Corp., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 91,566 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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fact that federal courts accord preclusive effect to state court findings
of fact is not inherently prejudicial to the successful prosecution of
Exchange Act claims. 34 But in many states, discovery rules are less
liberal3 5 than the federal rules.30 Limitations on the scope of dis-
34. According preclusive effect to state court determinations in jurisdictions that have
adopted procedural rules identical with or very similar to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure would not necessarily prejudice Exchange Act rights. As a result of the
similarity in such forums of federal and state discovery rules, state factual development
will have been assisted by the very procedural safeguards available in federal court. A
number of jurisdictions have adopted either the Federal Rules or very similar analogues:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Puerto
Rico, Tennessee, Utah, Virgin Islands, West Virginia, Wyoming. See I W. BARRON & A.
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 9.0-.53 (1960 & Supp. 1975). Through
partial statutory reform or court rule adoption, other states have undertaken efforts to
track the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules: Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.348
to 359 (1962 & Supp. 1975)); California (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2016-2034 (West 1965 &
Supp. 1979)); Florida (FLA. CT. R.C.P. §§ 1.280-.380); Louisiana (LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN.
art. 1421-1473 (West 1960 & Supp. 1978)); Maine (ME. CT. C.P.R. §§ 26-37); Missouri (Mo.
CT. C.P.R. 56-61); South Dakota (S.D. Cosip. LAws ANN. §§ 15-6-26 to 37 (1967 & Supp.
1978)); Vermont (VT. CT. C.P.R. §§ 26-37); Washington (WASH. CT. C.P.R. §§ 26-37).
35. The prejudicial impact on Exchange Act rights resulting from the interrelation of
collateral estoppel and restrictive state procedure has been noted by a number of federal
cases. See, e.g., Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 675 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) ("It is at least arguable that in creating and defining a particular federal claim,
Congress assumed that the claim would be litigated only in the context of federal-court
procedure-a fair assumption when the claim is within exclusive federal jurisdiction ...
Congress may have thought the liberal federal discovery procedures crucial to the properdetermination of the factual disputes underlying the federal claim."); Weisfeld v. Spartans
Indus., Inc., 58 F.R.D. 570, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (stay of parallel federal action denied be-
cause "[d]iscovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is more liberal than discovery
under the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules").
Recent law review commentaries have also recognized the potential for prejudicial ad-judication of a state defendant's affirmative Exchange Act claims. See, e.g., Note, The
Collateral Estoppel Effect of Prior State Court Findings in Cases Within Exclusive Federal
Jurisdiction, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Collateral Estoppel].
The civil procedure codes of a number of states are, in varying degrees, less liberal than
the discovery mandates of the federal rules, see FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. These jurisdictions
include: Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and
Wisconsin. See I W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 9.0-.53
(1960 & Supp. 1975).
36. An important forum for securities cases, New York, illustrates the disparity between
liberal federal discovery provisions and restrictive state rules. In 1961, the New York
legislature rejected a liberal relevancy standard for discovery patterned after Federal Rule
26, see J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 3101.02 (1978)[hereinafter cited as 'WEINSTEIN & KORN), and incorporated a more cautious "material and
necessary" standard into the New York disclosure rules. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3101(a)
(McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1978-79).
The limited approach of the New York rule has substantially curtailed discovery in
securities suits. See, e.g., Matter of Baron v. Royal Paper Corp., 36 A.D.2d 112, 114, 318
N.Y.S.2d 327, 329 (1971) (in suit concerning sale of close corporation stock pursuant to
agreement stipulating accountant's share value report as final, discovery regarding
corporate books not permitted); Pearson v. Rosenberg, 22 A.D.2d 225, 228, 254 N.Y.S.2d
690, 693 (1964) (Breitel, J.) (derivative suit) ("examination should proceed only with
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covery may be detrimental to the counterclaiming litigant due to the
factual complexity of many securities cases. t In particular, proof of the
key element of a section 10(b) Exchange Act defense-scienter-38-may
be difficult without broad discovery. 39 Restrictions on access to cor-
porate documents or officials could thus effectively frustrate assertion
of an Exchange Act right.
If the state court defendant elects to file a parallel federal suit
contemporaneous with his state court Exchange Act defense in order
to avoid the possible prejudicial effects of collateral estoppel, he may
respect to specified matters and not broadly under the pleadings"). This limited discovery
approach may impair a state defendant's ability to prove Exchange Act claims (such as
§ 10(b) fraud) due to the often critical need for examination of masses of corporate
records. See, e.g., State v. DeGroot, 60 Misc. 2d 816, 817, 304 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (Sup. Ct.
1969) ("[court] cannot permit a roving examination of a great mass of documents without
proof that all that is sought is relevant and necessary").
Beyond the "materiality" standard, discovery in New York also is constrained by tech-
nical requirements absent from federal discovery. Depositions of nonparties may be taken
on a conditional basis only. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3101(a) (McKinney 1963 & Supp.
1978-79). Because depositions of corporate-related accountants and attorneys may be crucial
to a securities fraud defense and affirmative claim, Exchange Act rights may be seriously
jeopardized by the New York civil practice distinction between parties and nonparties.
Whereas Federal Rule 31(a) provides for the taking of depositions on written questions
without limitation, New York rules permit such depositions to be taken only when "the
examining party and the deponent so stipulate or when the testimony is to be taken
without the state." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3108 (McKinney 1963 9- Supp. 1978-79). As
written depositions are less costly than oral interrogation, see WEINSTEIN & KORN, supra,
at 3108.03,-the New York rules may be utilized to deprive a financially pressed Exchange
Act defendant of an inexpensive discovery vehicle.
Finally, New York rules also lack important procedural advances recently incorporated
into the federal rules. The 1970 amendments to the federal rules require supplementation
of interrogatory responses on the basis of subsequent information, see FED. R. Civ. P.
26(e); the New York code fails to impose on the respondent this continuing duty, see N.Y.
Civ. PRAC. LAW § 3134 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1978-79); WEINSTEIN & KORN, supra, at
3134.07. Consequently, newly uncovered corporate documents may be omitted from state
trial evidence without sanction.
In response to the restrictive nature of New York discovery, "[o]ften suits are brought in
federal court solely to take advantage of the broader disclosure available there." WEiN-
STEIN & KoRN, supra, at 3101.14; see Weisfeld v. Spartans Indus., Inc., 58 F.R.D. 570
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
37. See WEINSTEIN & KORN, suPra note 36, at 3101.14; Weinstein & Bergman, New
York Procedures to Obtain Information in Civil Litigation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1066, 1080-
81 (1957).
38. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (proof of scienter required
in private cause of action under Rule lOb-5).
39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); notes 35-36 supra.
It has also been argued that effective adjudication of Exchange Act affirmative claims in
state court would deprive the litigant of his federal right under the Seventh Amendment to
trial by jury. See Lecor v. District Court, 502 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1974); Wellington
Computer Graphics, Inc. v. Modell, 315 F. Supp. 24, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). \The jury trial
argument, however, may not be of great significance. In complicated securities cases, the
advantage or protection of jury as opposed to bench trial is of speculative value. Cf. In
re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977); In re Boise Cascade
Securities Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
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encounter serious obstacles. To avoid duplicative litigation, the federal
court can, upon motion, stay its consideration in deference to a pre-
viously initiated state court action, 40 postponing federal adjudication
until such time as the state court has established its specific findings
of fact. Should the district court grant a stay, the simultaneous liti-
gation strategy will then fail to shield the litigant from the unfavor-
able effects of collateral estoppel. 41 Even if successful, the dual suit
strategy, by requiring contemporaneous defense in one suit and pros-
ecution in another, dramatically increases litigation costs for the
state court defendant.
B. Judicial Inefficiency
By forcing state defendants to litigate simultaneously in two courts
to protect their Exchange Act rights, the disparate treatment of de-
fenses and counterclaims undermines the values of judicial economy
served by the compulsory counterclaim rule.42
In a state law suit based on a contractual obligation, a common
law fraud counterclaim would arise out of the same transaction as
the plaintiff's action and therefore would be a compulsory counter-
claim; if the defendant failed to raise the counterclaim at the same
time and in the same forum as the plaintiff's action, the litigant would
be barred from later assertion of the fraud claim. But an analogous
40. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 664 (1978) (decision to defer to state
court proceedings "largely committed to the discretion of the District Court").
In addition to the district court in Will, a number of other courts have granted motions
to stay parallel federal proceedings. See, e.g., Shareholders Management Co. v. Gregory,
449 F.2d 326, 327 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (federal action should not be dismissed but
stayed); Klein v. Walston & Co., 432 F.2d 936, 937 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (approving
of district court stay). Other courts have denied motions to stay contemporaneous federal
actions. See, e.g., Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806, 811 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971); Lewis v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 63
F.R.D. 39, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Weisfeld v. Spartans Indus., Inc., 58 F.R.D. 570, 581 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
41. Alternatively, a litigant may seek to immunize the federal action through a federal
injunction of the state proceeding. Such a litigation strategy would be based on one of
the enumerated exceptions to the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).
Litigants have argued that in order to prevent the intrusion of state determined facts,
a restraint of the state action was authorized as "necessary in aid" of district court Ex-
change Act exclusive jurisdiction. Despite the clear possibility that the federal court
adjudication of affirmative Exchange Act claims may be effectively precluded by state
court defense consideration, federal courts have refused to enjoin parallel state actions.
See, e.g., McGough v. First Arlington Nat'l Bank, 519 F.2d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1975);
Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin, 440 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971).
42. Under the compulsory counterclaim rule, all defendant claims arising out of the
transaction or occurrence subject of plaintiff's action must be asserted at the same time
and in the same forum as the plaintiff's suit. See FEn. R. Civ. P. 13(a); JAMES & HAZARD,
supra note 1, at 490.
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Exchange Act counterclaim cannot be pleaded in the state court action
and can only be adjudicated in a federal forum. In contrast to the
compulsory counterclaim rule that serves to consolidate all relevant
claims within one forum, 43 the rule requiring federal court adjudi-
cation of Exchange Act counterclaims fosters judicial inefficiency by
compelling federal and state courts to adjudicate essentially identical
claims and issues. 44
III. Toward a New Jurisdictional Scheme:
Inadequacies of Proposed Alternatives
The breakdown in exclusivity has resulted in a litigation pattern
detrimental to both Exchange Act claimants and the value of ju-
dicial economy. Two alternatives immediately present themselves:
restricting the jurisdiction of the states, or expanding the jurisdiction
of the states. But neither of these choices, in isolation, can adequate-
ly resolve the tension generated by the incomplete nature of exclu-
sive jurisdiction and the emergence of the transactional case.
A. Reduced State Court Jurisdiction: Federal Question Removal
Restricting the jurisdiction of the state courts would both prevent
the intrusion of state determined facts and guarantee the unitary ad-
judication of federal and state claims. The primary method that has
been suggested for achieving this objective is federal question re-
moval on the basis of an Exchange Act defense or counterclaim. 45
43. See Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim under Modern
Pleading, 38 MINN. L. REV. 423, 465 (1954) (compulsory counterclaim rule is "an important
part of the movement to end a multiplicity of litigation, and thus [is] in the interest of
both litigants and the public").
44. See Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1975) (dual
suit litigation results in waste of judicial resources, unnecessary burden on overcrowded
dockets, and undue burden on litigants).
In 1977, the number of cases filed in both the courts of appeals and the district courts
reached record proportions. See [1977] ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 2 [hereinafter cited as 1977 ANNUAL REPORT]. The
overcrowding of federal dockets has resulted in a judicial crisis termed by one study as
"the paradox of courts working furiously and litigants waiting endlessly." U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS: REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMITTEE ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 3 (1977).
45. See AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 187-207 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY]; Currie, The
Federal Courts and the American Law Institute II, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 271-76 (1969);
Moore, Problems of the Federal Judiciary, 35 F.R.D. 305, 316 (1964).
Under current judicial and statutory guidelines, a state defendant cannot remove the
action to federal court by pleading either a federal defense or a federal counterclaim.
See Tennessee v. Union and Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894); 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976).
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As outlined by the American Law Institute [ALI], a state defendant
pleading a federal defense or counterclaim would be allowed to re-
move the entire action to federal court, if either the defense is po-
tentially dispositive of the action and the amount in controversy ex-
ceeds 510,000, or the counterclaim is compulsory4" under state law
and asserts a substantial federal right.4 7
The ALl proposal seems to be responsive to many of the problems
that plague the current jurisdictional scheme. Federal question re-
moval would ensure that Exchange Act claims were adjudicated in
a federal forum. Because Exchange Act claimants would be protected
from the prejudicial effects of collateral estoppel, there would be no
incentive for these litigants to appear in more than one action. In
addition, judicial economy would be served by the resolution of the
dispute in one forum.
Although superior to the current pattern of prejudicial and inef-
ficient litigation, the ALl proposal is subject to certain serious in-
firmities. Because a defendant might perceive a tactical advantage
in forcing removal, 48 a lenient federal question removal standard
might clog already overburdened federal courts with frivolous de-
fenses and counterclaims that would waste judicial resources.40 The ALl
proposal seems to anticipate this problem by establishing standards
as barriers to purely tactical removal motions.50 But the ALl "dis-
The current removal restrictions have been justified on the grounds that removal is in-
appropriate "when litigants rely on federal rights to furnish them a shield but not a
sword." Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 234 (1948).
46. See note 42 supra.
47. See ALI STUDY, supra note 45, § 1312(a)(2), (3), at 25-26. Under ALl § 1312(b), a
number of federal acts are specifically exempted from the provision for federal defense and
counterclaim removal. Id. at 26-27. The Exchange Act is not included among the enumer-
ated acts. For a discussion of the ALl removal proposals, see Currie, supra note 45, at
269-76.
48. As conceded by the ALl draft, an ingenious lawyer might utilize federal defense
and counterclaim removal as a device to harass both plaintiff and court. See ALl SrUDY,
supra note 45, at 199-200. Such deliberate harassment might result in an unwarranted
settlement advantageous to the state defendant.
49. Many judges fear that further additions to federal jurisdiction will seriously im-
pair the capacity of federal courts. Chief Judge Phillips of the Sixth Circuit has been
particularly outspoken: "The federal courts are confronted with a crisis of such propor-
tions that their dockets threaten to become unmanageable. This situation is attributable
to at least three interrelated elements: a steadily rising caseload, expanded federal juris-
diction, and an insufficient number of judges to meet these demands." Phillips, The
Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction and the Crisis in the Courts, 31 VAND. L. REv. 17, 17(1978). See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 124 (1973) (questioning
advisability of permitting federal defense removal "when the federal courts are under such
severe pressure").
50. See ALI STUDY, supra note 45, § 1312(a)(2), (3), at 25-26 (barriers include amount in
controversy, "dispositive" defense, and "compulsory" counterclaim standards).
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positive," "substantial," and "compulsory" tests for removal are them-
selves likely to generate considerable, protracted litigation,5i which
would only be increased by the amount-in-controversy requirement.52
It is likely that the ALl felt compelled to impose these obstacles to
total removal in anticipation of congressional displeasure with any
proposal increasing the federal court caseload.53 However, by opting
for something less than complete federal removal, the ALI sacrificed
the efficiency of a rule of exclusive jurisdiction.
Moreover, the displacement of the state role resulting from fed-
eral question removal contradicts the principles of federalism em-
bodied in the balance between the state and federal judicial systems. 4
In the attempt to preserve the nexus between federal right and fed-
eral procedure, the ALI proposal fails to utilize the societal resources
traditionally concentrated in the state adjudication of state law claims. 5
B. Expanded State Court Jurisdiction: Concurrent Jurisdiction
The duplicative litigation pattern fostered by the incomplete na-
ture of exclusive jurisdiction might also be eliminated by the expan-
sion of state court jurisdiction. In a separate proposal, the ALI has
suggested that section 27 of the Exchange Act be amended to allow
state court concurrent jurisdiction."0 Following the ALI amendment,
51. Professor Currie finds the "compulsory counterclaim" test to be a particularly
ill-advised threshold requirement. See Currie, supra note 45, at 275 (test requires "burden-
some inquiry respecting state compulsory counterclaim rules"). The "dispositive" test may
lend itself to varying judicial interpretations. Additionally, the ALl draft fails to offer
guidelines as to what would be considered a ~'substantial" or "'insubstantial" Exchange Act
counterclaim.
52. See ALI STUDY, supra note 45, § 1312(a)(2), at 25. Removal motions will be subject
to the challenge that the amount-in-controversy requirement has not been satisfied.
53. In recent years, congressional legislation to modify or abandon federal diversity
jurisdiction has been regularly introduced. While all such attempts, including the most
recent, H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), have failed, diversity jurisdiction continues to
be subject to sharp attack. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 49, at 23-26. A proposal for state
court adjudication of "exclusive" counterclaims might gain wider congressional acceptance
as it would reduce rather than increase federal caseloads.
54. The Burger Court has indicated its intention to restore the federalist balance
through increased deference to state court adjudications. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
55. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
56. ALl STUDY, supra note 45, at 78-79, 183, 413. The draft of the ALI Proposed Federal
Securities Code would also authorize state courts to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over
civil securities actions. AMERICAN LAW INsTITUTE, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, § 1822, at 701
(1978) [hereinafter cited as ALI CODE]. The ALI proposal for concurrent jurisdiction has
been cited in circuit opinions. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mutual Reinsurance Co.,
600 F.2d 1228, 1235 n.16 (7th Cir. 1979); Colter v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, 526
F.2d 537, 542 n.l (3d Cir. 1975).
The Exchange Act is the only federal securities act mandating exclusive jurisdiction.
All other federal securities legislation provides for concurrent jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Exchange Act
a state court could entertain jurisdiction over plaintiff Exchange
Act claims as well as defendant Exchange Act defenses and counter-
claims. One advantage of this proposal is that it would clearly elim-
inate any controversy about the extent of state court jurisdiction
under the Exchange Act.5 7 As a result, judicial economy would be
improved by the unitary adjudication of the Exchange Act defense
and counterclaim. But before the states can share full responsibility
for adjudicating Exchange Act claims, the traditional arguments sup-
porting exclusive federal jurisdiction must be overcome.5 8
Securities Act of 1933, § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976); Investment Company Act of
1940, § 44, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1976); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 214, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-14 (1976). Cf. Loss, supra note 10, at 1275 ("the dubious advantages of exclusive
federal jurisdiction do not sufficiently outweigh the complexities it has created . . . and
the statute [§ 27] should be amended to conform to the concurrent-jurisdiction pattern of
all the other SEC acts").
57. See generally note 10 supra (discussing extent of state court jurisdiction of Exchange
Act defenses).
58. For caselaw and commentaries discussing the traditional arguments supporting
exclusive federal jurisdiction, see, e.g., Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 670-72
(1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); American Distilling Co. v. Brown, 184 Misc. 431, 433, 51
N.Y.S.2d 614, 616 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd mem., 269 App. Div. 763, 54 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1st
Dept.), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 36, 64 N.E.2d 347 (1945); ALI STUDY, supra note 45, at 164-68;
Currie, supra note 45, at 268.
The traditional arguments supporting exclusive federal jurisdiction fail to find ex-
pression in the legislative history of the Exchange Act. At best, fragments of the legisla-
tive history suggest that the congressional grant of Exchange Act exclusive jurisdiction
was largely the result of "pure happenstance." ALI STUDY, supra note 45, at 183. The early
versions of the House bill failed to indicate specifically whether jurisdiction was to be
exclusive or concurrent. See H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Stock Exchange
Regulation: Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934) (bill is at 1-15). An intermediate version
explicitly mandated concurrent Exchange Act jurisdiction. See H.R. 7924, 73rd Cong., 2d
Sess., § 6(a), 78 CONG. REC. 8029 (1934) (bill is at 8028-8030). The bill finally reported out
of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce simply provided that "[t]he district
courts of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction of violations of this title . . ." H.R.
9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., § 26 (1934), reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES
ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES ExCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item 30 at 52 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. With virtually no floor debate, the bill was successfully amended
to authorize exclusive federal jurisdiction. See 78 CONG. REC. 8099 (1934) (amendment
offered by Congressman Rayburn) ("Mr. Chairman, I have only this to say-that we
thought the bill as drawn meant exclusive, but in order that it may be entirely clear we
offer this amendment"); H.R. 9323, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., § 26 (1934) (bill passed by
House), reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Item 31 at 52. In the Senate, an early draft
of the bill mandated concurrent jurisdiction. S. 2642, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., § 8(a) (1934).
reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Item 33 at 11. A later Senate draft eliminated the
explicit concurrent feature. See S. 2693, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., § 25(a) (1934), 78 CONG. REc.
2265-2270 (1934) (§ 25(a) at 2269-2270). This ambiguous approach was incorporated into
the bill actually passed by the Senate. See S. 3420, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., § 26(a) (1934),
reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Item 27 at 50.
The disparity between the "exclusive" House bill and the ambiguous Senate draft was
briefly acknowledged in the Senate debate on the bill. See 78 CONG. REC. 8571 (1934) (re-
marks of Senators Byrnes, Fletcher, and Steiwer). The matter was left for Conference
Committee determination. Id. This apparently minor dispute was resolved by the Con-
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Proponents of exclusive jurisdiction advance four principal claims
in support of their position. First, they argue that uniform inter-
pretation of the Exchange Act is promoted by denying jurisdiction
to state courts. 59 Although the uniformity argument might support
reduced state responsibility, it fails to distinguish between what ex-
ists currently and full concurrent jurisdiction: present law already
tolerates serious state intrusions into the uniform, federal adjudica-
tion of the Exchange Act. 0° The interpretative uniformity argument
ference Committee in favor of the House text. See 78 CONG. REC. 9939 (1934); S. Doc. No.
185, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H. REP. No. 1838, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). Neither
Senate nor House document indicates any reason for the election of Exchange Act ex-
clusive jurisdiction.
59. It has been argued that state court interpretation of federal rights raised as coun-
terclaims would add the views of the 50 state courts to whatever interpretative disparities
exist among the 11 federal circuits. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 675-76,
(1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his opinion, Justice Brennan extends the uniformity
argument as support for a federal no-estoppel rule: "If res judicata effect is accorded the
prior state court judgment, the exclusive jurisdiction given the federal courts over 1934
Act claims would be effectively thwarted, and the policy of uniform and effective federal
administration and interpretation of the 1934 Act frustrated." Id. As support for the denial
of state court jurisdiction, it has been asserted that the practical limits of Supreme Court
review of state decisions prevent resolution of Exchange Act interpretative conflicts among
courts of different states or between the courts of the federal and state systems. Indeed,
the number of state court appeals the Supreme Court may review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 (1976) is greatly limited by the sheer number of certiorari petitions filed. See P.
BREsr, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 76 (1975) ("Court now grants less than
5 percent of the petitions filed"); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP
ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 3-4 (1972) (percentage of petitions granted has
dropped from 17.5% in 1941 to 5.8% in 1971).
60. In particular, a state court may resolve the facts and law pertaining to an Ex-
change Act defense. See pp. 97-98 supra.
State court adjudication of Exchange Act defenses is not the only significant intrusion
into exclusive federal jurisdiction. In a number of areas, state proceedings may have an
important bearing on federal Exchange Act claims. State court specific findings of fact
concerning an Exchange Act defense or state law counterclaims may be accorded significant
collateral estoppel effect in federal actions concerning related Exchange Act claims. See
pp. 101-05 supra. Furthermore, state court approval of settlements releasing Exchange
Act claims, which involves consideration of both facts and Exchange Act law, will be
recognized in federal courts despite the § 27 grant of exclusive jurisdiction. See, e.g., Boothe
v. Baker Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 168 (D. Del. 1966) (Exchange Act §§ 10b, 14a suit barred
by state court adoption of referee's recommendation to approve settlement); Dembitzer
v. First Repub. Corp., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,566
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (state court settlement of breach of fiduciary duty and self-dealing claims
held to bar § l0b action); cf. Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir.
1968) (state court has power to approve release of § 10b claim as a condition of settlement;
state approval of release, not principle of res judicata, precludes federal relitigation).
The uniformity argument may also be challenged on the grounds that interpretative
conflicts among the federal circuits are often not resolved due to the low number of
cases granted certiorari by the Supreme Court. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note
59, at 1-9; Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Private Civil Actions, 70
HARv. L. REV. 509, 511 (1957). But see H. FRIENDLY, supra note 49, at 52 ("[m]y own
impression is that ... resolved and unresolved conflicts in any [Supreme Court] term are
relatively few.") (footnote omitted). As state court Exchange Act counterclaim jurisdiction
would only marginally enlarge the extent of state court involvement, it is unlikely that
state counterclaim consideration would measurably add to existing judicial conflict.
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is further strained by the fact that state courts are free to award equi-
table relief on the basis of an Exchange Act defense and are pro-
hibited only from ordering affirmative relief or damages.01 When
an Exchange Act defense is raised to a state law contract action,
equitable relief rescinding the agreement may be of greater signif-
icance to the litigants than a monetary award.62 Additionally, de-
ciding issues surrounding a plea for equitable relief may require as
extensive an interpretation of federal securities law as would ana-
lyzing a counterclaim.
Second, it is generally assumed that federal judges possess greater
expertise than state jurists in adjudicating federal law.63 However,
this concern over the competence of state judges to rule on federal
counterclaims seems less compelling today than when the Exchange
Act was adopted. The assumption that state judges are unable to
grapple with securities law originated in an era in which securities
legislation was relatively foreign to state systems. Today, state courts
are much more familiar with securities litigation as a result of the
adoption of the Uniform Securities Act [USA] in a majority of states. 64
61. A similarly tenuous distinction exists at the level of defenses, which can be ad-judicated by a state court, and counterclaims, which cannot. See, e.g., Susquehanna S.S.
Co. v. Andersen & Co., 239 N.Y. 285, 292, 146 N.E. 381, 383 (1925) (Cardozo, J.) ("A dis-
cussion of ... subtlety has centred upon the distinction between . . . counterclaims and
. . . defenses"). See generally 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 13.09 (2d ed. 1979 & Supp.
1978-79).
As a function of the difficulties in distinguishing counterclaims from affirmative de-
fenses, the draftsmen of the Federal Rules adopted a highly flexible standard for the
treatment of counterclaims and defenses: "When a party has mistakenly designated a
defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so
requires, shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation." FED. R. Civ.
P. 8(c). For judicial construction of the Rule 8(c) permissive standard, see 2A MooRE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.27(3] (2d ed. 1979 & Supp. 1978-79).
62. Rescission of a promissory note agreement is central to any deficiency defense. If
equitable relief is granted, the defendant will have been largely compensated for the
plaintiff's Exchange Act violation. Additional affirmative claims for lost transaction or
opportunity costs, while significant, may suffer from problems of proof. Further, the
value of the rescissionary remedy is increased in light of the statutory, see § 28(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976), and judicial rejection of claims for Exchange Act punitive
damages, see Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303 (3d Cir. 1977); Straub
v. Vaisman & Co., Inc., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976). But see Hall v. Security Planning
Services, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 405, 408 (D. Ariz. 1976) ("defendants' course of conduct . . .
so filled with knowing and wilful fraud" as to warrant award of punitive damages).
Punitive damages may be obtained in federal court on the basis of pendent state law
claims. See Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1972). See generally R. JENNINGS &
H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 1085-88 (1977).
63. See ALl STUDY, supra note 45, at 164-65; Note, Collateral EstoPpel, supra note 35, at
1282; Note, Nonfederal Proceedings, supra note 10, at 961.
64. Drafted by Louis Loss and Edward M. Cowett, the Uniform Securities Act [USA]
was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on
August 25, 1956. Since that time, thirty-two states as well as the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico have codified the Act. See 7A UNIoAt LAws ANNOTATED 561-62 (1978) & 19
(Supp. 1979).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 89: 95, 1979
Because the USA tracks much of the language and many of the stan-
dards of the federal securities laws, 60 cases arising under the USA have
provided state court judges with the opportunity to hear and decide
securities cases analogous in many respects to federal actions.60 More-
over, these is no compelling empirical evidence underlying the incom-
petency generalization. 67 An examination of margin requirement 8
litigation, the subject of a significant number of Exchange Act defenses
in state courts, is instructive. In state court cases in which violations of
65. In particular, the anti-fraud provisions of the USA and Exchange Act are virtually
identical. Section 101 of the USA provides:
§ 101. [Sales and Purchases]
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any
security, directly or indirectly
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
Compare the above language with that of Rule X-10B-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5:
Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
66. State courts have addressed claims similar to those under Exchange Act § 10(b) in
suits for violation of USA § 101. See, e.g., B & T Distributs. Inc. v. Riehle, 366 N.E.2d
178, 179 (Ind. 1977) (evidence sustained trial court judgment that alleged false representa-
tions did not violate Indiana Securities Act antifraud provision); Berki v. Reynolds
Secs., Inc., 277 Or. 335, 341, 560 P.2d 282, 286 (1977) (alleged manipulation of plaintiff's
stock account did not violate antifraud section of Oregon Securities Act). Cases analogous
to Exchange Act § 10(b) civil actions have also arisen under the USA § 410 provision for
civil liability in cases of false representations or material omissions. See, e.g., Shultz v.
Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 552 S.W.2d 4 (Ark. 1977); City of Owensboro v. First U.S.
Corp., 534 S.W.2d 789 (Ky. 1975).
67. The belief that state courts are incompetent to adjudicate Exchange Act claims
appears to be derived largely from the fact that Congress in drafting § 27 affirmatively
withdrew jurisdiction from the state system, see note 58 suPra. One commentator has
suggested, however, that the congressional grant to the states of concurrent jurisdiction
under the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976), "is ... evidence that [the Congress) did not
lack confidence in the competency of state courts to handle securities matters." Note,
Implied Rights Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934-Federal Jurisdiction-Exclusive
or Concurrent?, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 93, 97 (1969) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited
as Implied Rights].
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78(g) (1976). Implementing Federal Reserve Board regulations include:
Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.8 (1979); Regulation U, id. §§ 221.1-A; Regulation G, id.
§§ 207.1-.5; Regulation X, id. §§ 224.1-.6.
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federal margin requirements have been raised as a defense, state
decisions conform closely to those of federal courts.0 9
Third, it has been asserted that state courts may be hostile to un-
familiar federal claims arising in familiar state law contract actions.70
While perhaps applicable to civil rights claims,-' the proposition
that state courts deliberately seek to undermine the assertion of
federal rights appears inapposite to Exchange Act claims. The Ex-
change Act fails to implicate inflammatory issues that might compel
a state jurist to oppose an Exchange Act claim simply because it
involves a federal rather than a state right. In light of the adop-
tion of the USA in many states, the interests of the state and
federal judicial systems in the rights of security holders appear to
be coterminous. 72
The fourth and most compelling argument against concurrent jur-
isdiction centers on the disparate impact of federal and state dis-
covery provisions in the vindication of Exchange Act rights. What
is gained by a federal removal scheme 73 is lost by the concurrent
jurisdiction proposal. Because a federal claimant would still prefer
federal procedure,74 concurrent jurisdiction would encourage a race
to the courthouse. Only if the federal plaintiff filed suit in federal
court prior to the institution of the state proceeding could he de-
69. State and federal courts generally have held that borrowers cannot avoid liability
on stock agreements that do not explicitly violate federal margin regulations. Compare
Drasner v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) and Newman
v. Pershing & Co., 412 F. Supp. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) with Gregory-Massari, Inc. v. Purkitt,
I Cal. App. 3d 968, 82 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1969) and Billings Assocs., Inc. v. Bashaw, 27
A.D.2d 124, 276 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1967). But see Staley v. Salvesen, 35 Pa. D. & C. 2d 318,
324-26 (Phil. County Ct. 1963) (plaintiff broker's failure to liquidate customer's cash ac-
count violated Regulation T guidelines thereby permitting borrower to avoid liability).
See generally Climan, Civil Liability Under the Credit-Regulation Provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 CORNELL L. RIv. 206, 227-29 (1978).
70. See ALl STUDY, supra note 45, at 167-68; Note, Collateral Estoppel, supra note 35,
at 1282; Currie, supra note 45, at 268.
Effectively insulated from federal court supervision or intervention, see 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1976) (federal anti-injunction statute greatly restricts power of federal courts to enjoin
state court proceedings); ALI STUDY, suPra note 45, at 167-68 (Supreme Court and federal
courts of appeals do not possess same "broad supervisory powers" over state courts that
can be exercised with regard to inferior federal tribunals), a state court can employ
dilatory tactics that may seriously impede a state litigant's federal rights, see, e.g., NAACP
v. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 290-93 (1964) (Court opinion recites procedural devices utilized
by Alabama courts to frustrate assertion of NAACP's federal defense to state law action).
71. See NAACP v. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); ALI STUDY, supra note 45, at 167-68.
72. The growing identity of legal concepts in the securities field is a function of two
factors: states that have adopted the USA have essentially codified many of the key
provisions of the Exchange Act, see note 65 supra; and, common law and Exchange Act
fraud claims have been unified through the common requirement of scienter, see Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
73. See pp. 106-07 supra.
74. See pp. 103-04 supra.
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rive the benefit of the liberal federal discovery rules. Although this
second ALI proposal would clarify the respective functions of state
and federal judges, litig-ants would still be wasting resources on the
question of jurisdiction. Important attractions of exclusive jurisdic-
tion-clarity and efficiency-would be lost.
IV. An Integrative Solution: State Court Counterclaim
Jurisdiction With Federal Procedural Safeguards
The problems illustrated by the Will scenario cannot be fully re-
solved by simply altering the allocation of Exchange Act jurisdic-
tion to expand or restrict the role of the states.7 To ensure the vin-
75. Implicitly recognizing the failures of the proposed allocational solutions, a number
of commentators have advocated modification of the rules of collateral estoppel. See, e.g.,
Note, Collateral Estoppel, supra note 35, at 1296; Comment, Exclusive Federal Jurisdic-
tion: The Effect of State Court Findings, 8 STAN. L. REV. 439, 448-51 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as State Court Findings]. Under these proposals, federal courts would not be bound
by state determinations of fact and law pertaining to defenses based on exclusive federal
acts or state laws that parallel exclusive federal legislation. See Note, Collateral Estoppel,
supra note 35, at 1296 (preclusive effect should only be given to state adjudication of
defenses premised on statutes that do not duplicate exclusive federal laws).
A "no-estoppel" rule would thus encourage a state court litigant to raise a federal
defense without fear of the adverse impact on a subsequent federal action. However, the
no-estoppel rule fails to resolve adequately the problems of bifurcated counterclaim ad-
judication. Separate state and federal suits would still be necessary in order to adjudicate
fully all affirmative and defensive Exchange Act claims; the state defendant still would
be required to expend funds and energies in the defense of one suit and prosecution of
another. The no-estoppel provision also fails to serve judicial economy needs. In fact,
federal courts following a no-estoppel format would be deprived of the benefit of
previous fact finding. See Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin, 440 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971) (state determined facts "should be welcomed [so as] to avoid
the task of reconsidering issues which have already been settled by another competent
tribunal"); Note, The Law of Fact: Findings of Fact Under the Federal Rules, 61 HARV.
L. REv. 1434, 1435 (1948) (federal courts seek to avoid "the time-consuming burden of
finding the facts specially").
Moreover, this version of collateral estoppel fails to recognize that the boundary between
state defenses that do and do not duplicate exclusive federal law has become increasingly
indefinite. Although many of the USA provisions track federal securities law, see note 65
supra, several states have in turn modified specific USA sections, see 7A UNIFORNI LAwS
ANNOTATED 563-66 (1978) & 19-20 (Supp. 1979). As a result, federal courts will experience
difficulties in determining which state defense findings should be accorded preclusive
effect. Ambiguities in the distinctions between duplicative and nonduplicative state de-
fenses are likely to lead to wasteful litigation as common law and Exchange Act fraud
standards merge. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Note, Administra-
tive Collateral Estoppel: The Case of Subpoenas, 87 YALE LJ. 1247, 1263 (1978).
In addition, determinations on the basis of nonliberal state discovery of defenses that
do not duplicate federal law could have serious prejudicial impact on a subsequent
federal adjudication. In the course of adjudicating even nonduplicative state claims, the
state court is almost certain to make factual determinations regarding many issues (e.g.,
representations made during the securities transaction). According to the Harvard pro-
posal, such determinations should be accorded preclusive effect in federal court. See Note,
Exchange Act
dication of Exchange Act rights and to serve judicial economy, a
scheme integrating procedural protection and clear jurisdictional path-
ways is necessary. Such an integrative approach would require state
courts to adjudicate Exchange Act counterclaims utilizing federal pro-
cedural safeguards.
By resolving all elements of an Exchange Act dispute in one forum,
counterclaim jurisdiction would remove duplicative litigation from
the dockets of the federal and state systems. 76 Moreover, plenary state
court jurisdiction of counterclaims would minimize litigation costs
for both the courts and the parties in interest. At the same time, the
imposition of federal procedural safeguards, most notably discovery,
would relieve concern about the limitations of state court adjudication.
Authority exists for the imposition of federal procedural safeguards
in the state adjudication of Exchange Act counterclaims. When Con-
gress conferred concurrent jurisdiction on state courts to hear Federal
Employers' Liability Act [FELA]77 claims, it failed to address the
issue of whether federal or state procedural rules should apply.78 The
Supreme Court has held, however, that federal rules are applicable. 79
The basis of this ruling was the Court's determination that restric-
tive local rules of procedure should not be allowed to frustrate the
assertion of federally created rights in a state forum.80 The Court
Collateral Estoppel, suPra note 35, at 1296. However, state findings pertaining to these
questions will be relevant to federal Exchange Act claims. The proposal thus appears to
allow such state findings to have an indirect but nevertheless binding effect on federal
Exchange Act proceedings.
76. The strain on overworked federal judicial resources would be alleviated through
the elimination of the need for an Exchange Act state defendant to file a parallel federal
action. Furthermore, the Note proposal would shield the federal judiciary from the
adjudication of time-consuming ancillary motions (e.g., motions to stay federal proceedings
or enjoin state actions) incident to exclusive jurisdiction. Inferior federal courts would
also have no appellate role to play with respect to state adjudication of Exchange Act
counterclaims. The federal system would be implicated only by Supreme Court certiorari
review. While reducing federal caseloads, state counterclaim jurisdiction will not impose
a consequent "undue" burden on state tribunals. State courts are likely to find that
counterclaim adjudication merely entails an additional remedy judgment premised on
facts and issues already evolved by Exchange Act defense consideration. CI. Bell, Crisis in
the Courts: Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 3, 10 n.19 (1978) (resolution of Con-
ference of [State] Chief Justices indicating that "state court systems are able and willing
to provide needed relief to the federal court system").
77. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
78. See id. § 56.
79. See Dice v. Akron C. & Y.R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 362-64 (1952); Brown v. Western
Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 296-99 (1949).
80. See Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1949), quoting Davis
v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923); Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Actions-
The Converse of the Erie Problem?, 17 OHio ST. LJ. 384, 414 (1956) ("[i]n general it is
undoubtedly desirable that a state court should give effect to federally-created rights sub-
stantially as a federal district court would ... ").
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feared that nonliberal state provisions for pleading8 l or jury trial8 2
would deprive FELA litigants of the federal procedural protections
that are "part and parcel"'8 3 of their federally created rights.8 4 Based
upon the Court's FELA decisions, Congress has the power to intro-
duce federal procedural safeguards into the state court adjudication
of Exchange Act defenses and counterclaims.8 5
81. See, e.g., Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 938 U.S. 294, 299 (1949) (complaint
alleging negligence held sufficient to survive general demurrer despite contrary state
ruling on the basis of "over-exacting local requirements for meticulous pleadings"); Note,
State Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1551, 1561-62 (1960).
82. See, e.g., Dice v. Akron C. & Y.R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 362-64 (1952) (issue of
fraudulent release in FELA negligence case should have been tried before jury despite
contrary state practice); Note, supra note 81, at 1562-64.
83. Dice v. Akron C. & Y.R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952).
84. Some commentators have suggested that the Court's concern for procedural pro-
tection is sharply limited to the context of FELA actions. See Hill, supra note 80, at 415;
Comment, 50 COLUM. L. Rav. 385, 388 (1950). Others have accorded the Court's FELA
decisions a much more expansive impact. See note 85 infra (citing authorities); Note,
Procedure Applicable To Suits in State Courts under Federal Act, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 799,
804 (1952); 22 TENN. L. REv. 581, 584 (1952). As the Court's opinions in Brown and Dice,
see notes 79-82 supra, fail to restrict explicitly the scope of permissible introductions of
federal procedure into state adjudications of federal claims, a broad reading of the
Court's rationale would appear justified. Cf. Note, Procedural Protection for Federal
Rights in State Courts, 30 U. CINN. L. REv. 184, 193-96 (1961) (uncertainty as to the ex-
tension of the Court's FELA approach); 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 369, 372 (1952) (if Court in-
tended to establish new procedural doctrine it "should have done so clearly and without
equivocation") (footnote omitted).
85. As noted by Professor Wright, "even if the FELA cases are unique, they stand for
the proposition that Congress has constitutional power to control the incidents of a state
trial of a federal claim." C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 196 (3d
ed. 1976) (footnote omitted). Other commentators have expressed similar views on this
issue, see, e.g., Note, Implied Rights, supra note 67, at 106 n.60.
As the FELA Supreme Court cases provide constitutional authority for the imposition
of federal procedure, it is important to recognize that the alleged procedural inadequacies
of state FELA adjudication do not impair the integrity of the proposed Exchange Act
amendment. State FELA litigation has been sharply criticized for the failure of state
courts to rule properly on the sufficiency of evidence needed to submit a FELA case to
a jury. See, e.g., Alderman, What the New Supreme Court Has Done to the Old Law of
Negligence, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 110 (1953). Indeed, the disparity in state, as well
as federal, rulings has resulted in a volume of Supreme Court certiorari review felt by
some members of the Court to be unjustifiably burdensome. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Moore-
McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 524, 546 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (ob-
jecting to the grant of certiorari).
However, the alleged failings of the state courts in FELA cases is substantive and not
procedural in origin. The range of state decisions on the sufficiency of evidence is at-
tributable to the failure of both federal and state courts to articulate a clear standard of
employer liability. Although nominally premised on a common law negligence standard,
the threshold for FELA liability has been ambiguously lowered by judicial action to
approximate strict liability in tort. See, e.g., Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S.
500, 506 (1957) ("Under this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs
justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the
slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.") (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted); Corso, How F.E.L.A. Became Liability Without Fault, 15 CLEV.-
MAR. L. REv. 344 (1966); PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw or TORTS 536 (4th ed. 1971).
In direct contrast, the liability standard for Exchange Act fraud has been clearly re.
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Reference to the factual background of Will illustrates how the
proposed experiment with state court adjudication of Exchange Act
claims would sacrifice neither litigation economy nor procedural pro-
tection. Rather than being compelled to appear in duplicative fed-
eral and state actions, the Will state defendant under the proposed
amendment could respond to the state law action by the unitary plead-
ing of both defensive and affirmative Exchange Act claims. Assertion
of an Exchange Act right would trigger the critical introduction of
federal procedure into the state proceedings. With all elements of
the dispute concentrated in one forum, the state court adjudication
of both federal and state claims would attain the procedural status
of res judicata and not collateral estoppel s6
Conclusion
The efficiency values of exclusive federal jurisdiction have failed
to survive the modern emphasis on the transactional case. This col-
lision of procedural reforms has resulted in a jurisdictional pattern
that disserves the courts and the Exchange Act litigants.
The original goals underlying the Act's jurisdictional plan need
not be abandoned. Although the pristine clarity of exclusive juris-
diction is beyond recovery, an allocational and procedural approach
that integrates state counterclaim jurisdiction with federal procedur-
al safeguards would serve judicial economy interests in a manner con-
sistent with the policies underlying exclusive federal jurisdiction.
defined. Recently, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected a negligence approach and
instead imposed an "intent to deceive" test for § l0b liability. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hoch-
felder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, 214 (1976). Properly characterized, the "substantive" law problems
of FELA state litigation are thus not likely to extend to the state adjudication of Ex-
change Act defenses and counterclaims.
Indeed, the argument for the introduction of federal procedural safeguards is thus
particularly compelling in the case of state court adjudication of Exchange Act counter-
claims. If federal procedural protection is necessary to the proof of negligence in the
FELA setting, see pp. 115-16 supra, similar procedural security would appear warranted
for Exchange Act claims and defenses requiring proof of a higher liability standard-
scienter.
86. This Note's analysis of Exchange Act exclusive jurisdiction can be applied to other
areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction. In each instance, however, the most desirable
remedial model will be dependent upon the balance among the policies served by the
jurisdictional allocation-such as the need for expertise-and the general goals of the
jurisdictional scheme-such as the need for clarity.
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